The Ukrainian crisis changed the post Cold War status quo in Europe. Russia, considering the support of Western partners for regime change in Kiev as a betrayal, defended its vital interests, while the West saw this as pure and simple aggression by a superpower.
The Ukrainian crisis has started in a period of US-Russian rivalry, even confrontation, reminiscent of the Great Game of the 19th century: the struggle for supremacy between the Russian and British Empire. This competition is asymmetrical and highly unequal. The current conflict, extending to the political, economic and information spheres, has also included the war side since February. It differs from the Cold War in that the contacts between people, trade and information flows are not completely disrupted, and cooperation between the sides is partially preserved.
Russia's interests are focused on post-Soviet integration in Eurasia, while the United States of America initiates the restoration of Trumanian containment against Russia in Europe.
The United States of America's approach to Russia reflects traditional fears, even phobias, and is not based on an adequate understanding of the country, also because Russia has ceased to be the foreign policy focus of the White House as it was in 1945 -1991, "fear" replaced today by the People's Republic of China.
The international system is becoming more balanced, and Washington must prepare for this by developing a policy course that takes into account the interests of key players, including Russia. Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia are becoming the site of an influence struggle between Washington and Moscow. That rivalry also involves a number of other countries and territories, including Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia's North Caucasus, Crimea and the Baltic states. Meanwhile in Central Europe, Poland - the one most tied to the Ukraine crisis - is hardening its stance against Russia.
With the development of the Ukrainian crisis, relations between Western Europe and Russia are changing significantly. The period of cooperation and mutual understanding that began with the reunification of Germany is over.
At the same time, Russia's tough policy in Ukraine and its willingness to challenge the United States of America have strengthened Moscow's reputation in the Middle East and Asia.
The political-military crisis that erupted in Ukraine in early 2014 marked the end of the constructive relationship between Russia and the West that developed after the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. As a result, we have a new period of heightened rivalry with the opponents of the past cold war, who believed themselves dead and buried. That confrontation is reminiscent of the Cold War, but differs from it in many ways. In the current situation, the value component is represented to a lesser extent than the conflict between communism and liberal democracy, which had a permeating ideological and political thickness, hence a moral justification.
It must be said that the traditional military dimension - which is always present - has not become predominant and exclusive, or at least not yet. The Ukrainian crisis is fraught with global consequences, but in itself it does not have a central significance for the international system and does not become an organizing principle of world politics and the foreign policy of the main participants in the conflict, primarily the United States of America. The severity of the crisis came as a surprise to many in Ukraine itself, in Russia and in the United States of America. Many experts of Ukraine were taken aback by the dynamic development of events.
At the end of February 2014, Ukraine "swigged" too strongly and sharply to the West and lost its strategic balance that had held it for almost a quarter of a century. Earlier, US support for “liberal” change in Ukraine – achieved through the overthrow of a democratically elected president – had gone beyond its usual boundaries, and the reaction from Russia, which felt cornered, surprised everyone.
The Ukrainian crisis was preceded by a competition between the European Union and Russia over the geo-economic orientation of Ukraine. The roots of the crisis are linked to the Russo-Georgian war of 2008, which ended the possibility of Georgia and Ukraine joining NATO, and to the turmoil in the global financial market, which increased the relevance of regional economic structures.
The Russian Federation, in turn, has tried to involve Ukraine and most of the other post-Soviet states in the implementation of its Customs Union project which ended in May 2014 with the signing of an agreement on the creation of the Eurasian Economic Union and on improving its position in relations with the large continental neighbors: the EU at west and the People's Republic of China to the east.
Both Brussels and Moscow considered Ukraine an important element of their geopolitical projects. The Russian side also tried to explore the possibility of Ukraine's simultaneous integration with the EU and the Customs Union, which would allow it to maintain a balance within the country and in international relations. However, Westerners totally rejected negotiations with “another” party regarding the association of Ukraine. Eventually, both Russia and the EU began to view the choice of Ukraine as a zero-sum game and spared no effort to influence its outcome. Eventually, the results are seen day by day on TV, and reading in the newspapers.