The March 10th, 2025, an agreement between the Syrian interim government and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) marked an unprecedented recognition of Kurdish identity. However, its implementation is surrounded by uncertainties that risk exacerbating certain points of controversy. Among these is the integration of Kurdish forces into a new Syrian army, as Damascus and Ankara have moved closer. Signed between Syrian interim President Ahmed al-Sharaa and Mazloum Abdi, commander-in-chief of the SDF, the agreement contains eight points marking a break with the position previously occupied by the Kurds in the Syrian political landscape. Indeed, the second article of the agreement stipulates that "the Syrian state guarantees to the Kurdish community all its constitutional rights."
Until the fall of former President Bashar Al-Assad, the Kurds were particularly repressed and their rights violated. More than 500,000 Kurds were considered stateless before Bashar al-Assad's 2011 reform allowing broader access to Syrian citizenship. This initiative would have allowed approximately 350,000 members of the Kurdish community to effectively acquire Syrian nationality. Damascus's main objective was to maintain calm in Syrian regions populated by Kurds, as protests gradually shook the country. In a context of violence targeting the Alawite community (from which Bashar al-Assad came) in particular, it was important for Ahmed al-Sharaa to sign an agreement with the Kurdish side in order to present an image of peacemaker in a society fractured by nearly fifteen years of war. The idea was also to integrate the resources available to the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES), essential for the country's economic reconstruction. If this agreement represents a political victory for the interim government, it is also a political victory for Mr. Abdi, who can present himself as a political figure and not just as a warlord.
Even though the recognition of the Kurdish community as an integral part of the Syrian nation is a major step forward, the Kurds now face new challenges. The agreement provides for the integration of “the civil and military institutions (of AANES) into the administration of the Syrian state.” Although the agreement does not clearly mention the disarmament or dissolution of the SDF, which is primarily composed of Kurdish fighters from the People’s Protection Units (YPG), the de facto armed wing of the AANES, their integration into a new Syrian National Army is implied.
On March 13th, Ahmed al-Sharaa announced a temporary constitutional stipulation to provide a framework for the new regime, emphasizing the primacy of the Syrian Army as the sole armed entity in the country, but the request has instantly been rejected by Kurdish leaders in Syria. This rejection is explained by the regional and national security context:
In Syria, the Alawite community was the target of massacres in February. Skirmishes also persisted between the SDF and members of the Turkish-backed Free Syrian Army (FSA). The Kurdish militias wanted to keep their weapons and integrate into the new Syrian Army as a whole, not as individuals, to ensure their security. Questions also remain regarding foreign fighters within the SDF and the role of women, including the Women's Protection Units (YPJ), in a new Syrian Army. Moreover, factions close to Türkiye, grouped under the FSA, have already agreed to their integration into the new army. This would pose the challenge of having two enemies armed groups within the same entity.
The text of the agreement does not specify a specific mechanism or concrete modalities for military or administrative integration. The decentralization of the AANES is still not clearly established. The executive committee has one year to implement the various points of the agreement. The vagueness surrounding this implementation constitutes a major weakness. Furthermore, the agreement does not mention the nearly 10,000 prisoners of the Islamic State (IS) organization held by Kurdish fighters or the approximately 55,000 family members, Syrian and foreign, of the terrorist organization's fighters.
On March 30, the AANES denounced the new Syrian government appointed the day before. It accuses it of failing to take into account the country's diversity, which could jeopardize the end of the Syrian crisis. Of the 23 ministers, only one is Kurdish, and he is not from the territories controlled by the AANES. Three others are from other minorities, Christian, Alawite, and Druze. The AANES has declared that it will not implement the measures taken by the new government. Consequently, the path fragilely traced by the March 10 agreement still appears uncertain.
While the implementation of the agreement still appears to be a long and winding road, a major step forward has been made in the coexistence between the new Syrian government and the Kurdish authorities. On April 1, an agreement was signed between the authorities in Damascus and the committee of the districts of Ashrafiyeh and Sheikh Maqsoud. These neighbourhoods had been controlled by the YPG since 2012. The agreement provides for the withdrawal of Kurdish forces from the city to AANES territories, which is now effective. Kurdish administrative entities are to be maintained, and security is now ensured by the Assayish, the Kurdish internal forces, in coordination with Damascus. This last point also represents a major step forward: a Kurdish entity is being integrated into a sovereign role, which could pave the way for a similar integration of the SDF into the Syrian Army. The agreement and the troop withdrawal were accompanied by a massive release of prisoners captured after the fall of the former regime. A total of 146 detained SDF members were released by the new central government, while 97 fighters affiliated with Damascus were released by the Kurdish authorities. Furthermore, the SDF left the Tishreen Dam on April 12. They had occupied this strategic infrastructure since 2015, after retaking it from ISIS. The new Syrian Army occupied the site. The Syrian Army's control of the dam is a direct continuation of the SDF withdrawal from Aleppo and the March 10th agreement.
These events reflect a genuine desire for cooperation between Damascus and the AANES. Despite the shortcomings and challenges related to the internal political context and power struggles in the region, the March 10th agreement could lead to legitimate recognition of the Kurds in Syria. However, the path to lasting peace in Syria remains fraught with pitfalls, requiring continued support from the international community to ensure regional stability.