How will the war in Gaza come to an end?

Until now, Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu has refused to consider any political agreement to conclude hostilities in Gaza, or to discuss a more general Israeli-Palestinian peace process. In fact, the current devastation of the Gaza Strip appears to have for him no strategic aim, as Netanyahu's only real objective appears to be political: to preserve the cohesion of his extreme-right coalition in order to remain in power.

During a press conference in December 2023, Netanyahu affirmed that the Israeli army's ground offensive will not stop until all hostages held in Gaza are released and Hamas is completely and unconditionally destroyed. The possibility of a new Israeli occupation of the Gaza Strip has also been mentioned by other Israeli leaders.

However, this goal is both dangerous and unrealistic. Hamas is a Palestinian islamic and nationalist organization that has a considerable support and strong roots among the Palestinian population. Since its creation in 1987, Hamas has challenged the exclusive administration of the West Bank by the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). In fact, “security cooperation” between the Palestinian Authority and Israel has never been anything more than a euphemism to describe their common fight against Hamas in the West Bank, where the organization nevertheless continued to develop.

Today, thanks to its defiant attitude towards the Israeli army in Gaza, Hamas is gaining popularity among Palestinians, particularly in the West Bank, where the disastrous consequences of the war triggered by the October 7 massacre of Israeli civilians are not felt. And if Hamas manages to secure the release of Palestinian prisoners in exchange for the remaining Israeli hostages, a possibility currently under negotiation, its popularity will explode.

It is certainly possible that the Jewish state will succeed in eliminating the commanders of the political and military branches of Hamas, and thus destroy its chain of command and its ability to function as a structured organization. But Hamas' popularity suggests that, if nothing else occurs, its ideology will remain a central element of the Palestinian nationalist movement.

In reality, the claimed destruction of Hamas could in practice seriously undermine Israel's security. During the chaos that will follow the conflict, thousands of Hamas fighters are expected to join the ranks of criminal gangs, like those apparently holding some of the Israeli hostages, while others will join even more radical Salafist groups.

The implication is clear: If Hamas is annihilated, and there is no legitimate Palestinian authority capable of filling the void left by the Islamist group's disappearance, Israel risks being plunged into a new, equally challenging situation. Establishing a permanent buffer zone between Israel and Gaza, as the Israeli government appears to be planning, will do little to prevent this situation. Instead, it will drain the resources of the Hebrew state, like the “security zone” in South Lebanon until the withdrawal of the Israeli armed forces in 2000.

Chronic divisions and unrest on the Palestinian side further jeopardize the prospects for a lasting peace after the current hostilities. The PLO's political party, Fatah, is committed to finding a negotiated solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. But, as Palestinian Authority president Mahmoud Abbas is well aware, the increasingly popular Hamas must be represented in Palestinian institutions. A “reformed” Palestinian Authority could not legitimately govern Gaza after the war – as the United States advocates – without the approval of Hamas.
Such consent would involve reconciling the PLO's search for a political compromise on the one hand, and Hamas's struggle for the "historical" rights of Palestine, on the other. But it is impossible for Hamas to subscribe to the Oslo Accords negotiated by the PLO with Israel, because recognizing the Jewish state and renouncing the armed struggle against the "occupier" - two conditions of the agreements - would destroy its own legitimacy.

As long as the PLO fails to involve Hamas in the political process, it will be impossible to establish a legitimate Palestinian government in the Gaza Strip after the hostilities, let alone realize the dream of a Palestinian state. This situation is desirable neither for Israelis nor for Palestinians. But it perfectly serves the interests of Netanyahu and his extreme-right coalition.