Bashar’s wrong decisions

It is been a year since the Assad regime collapsed in Syria. The changes are enormous and their repercussions are not over yet. As the first anniversary passes, there are still perplexing questions, and the most prominent of them is: Why did Bashar al-Assad and his regime become obedient to Iran from the early years of their rule? And a plausible right answer might abruptly occurs: had he not pursued that dangerous policy, he might not have ended up in exile in Moscow.

More than eight years before the 2011 revolution against him, the Assad regime actively collaborated with Iran regionally on political and military levels. In coordination with Tehran, Syria was transformed into a hub for covert operations against the Americans, following their invasion of Iraq. At the same time, Iran was shrewdly playing a double game, using Bashar as a base for resistance while simultaneously cooperating with the Americans in dismantling what remained of Saddam Hussein's regime.

In the meantime, Assad was under the illusion that the Americans intended to change his regime after the fall of Saddam, while in reality, Washington had no interest in Damascus and did not target him, considering Syria a security zone for Israel.

Between 2004 and 2009, Syria became a training ground and transit route for thousands of armed groups, Iraqi, Arab, or jihadist. They were smuggled from Syria into Iraq through volatile border provinces like al-Anbar and Salah al-Din. These operations strengthened Iran's negotiating position with Washington and continued for years afterward.

On another front, Bashar al-Assad also used his regime to serve Iran's policies in Lebanon by eliminating a large number of opposition forces and enabling Hezbollah, to gain complete control. Iran worked to build Lebanon into its largest heavily armed front in the regional conflict with Israel.

With the outbreak of protests in Daraa and then the rest of Syria, it was expected that countries affected by the Syrian regime would rush to support the new movement, at least in part. The revolution succeeded, and the regime was on the verge of collapse, were Iran came at once to its rescue by mobilizing tens of thousands of fighters brought in from Lebanon, Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan.

After his survival, Bashar became even more convinced of the strategic importance of the relationship with Tehran, believing that the regime's fate was safer in Iran's embrace. In reality, his relationship with Tehran had been toxic from the start, a burden and a real danger to him.

His policies demonstrate his inability to understand the region's power dynamics and the dangerous game he had entered. Before the revolution, he had no need to ally with Tehran, as Europe opened its doors to him, and the moderate states were quick to welcome him. Actually, many Syrian opposition forces were also optimistic about his rise to power.

During the final years of Hafez al-Assad's life, Bashar participated behind the scenes in presidential activities, attended important meetings, and was present to the inner workings of the government. His subsequent decisions revealed that Bashar was nothing like his father, who maintained good relations with the regimes in Tehran, Riyadh, Moscow, and the West, navigating a carefully calculated trajectory against the Ba'ath regime and Türkiye. Hafez benefited from Israel, which was crucial in ensuring the security of the minority Alawite regime. He also welcomed cooperation with the Americans in the war against Saddam Hussein in 1990.

It must also be said that the lifespan of the Assad regime in Syria, a product of the Cold War, had practically expired before Bashar al-Assad came to power. His rise to power left a small window of opportunity, requiring him to adapt to the end of the Cold War and the shift in regional relations under a single dominant international power. However, he consistently made the wrong decisions at every turn, right up until his last day in office. Recent information confirms that Moscow abandoned Bashar al-Assad approximately ten days before the regime's collapse, when Ahmed al-Sharaa's forces successfully launched their military campaign in the Aleppo countryside and began their advance towards Damascus. Then, Russia realized that the regime's collapse was inevitable.

The fall of Bashar al-Assad was a resonant one for the region and the world. He collapsed before the eyes of Iran and its allies, who were powerless to do anything this time. With his departure, the Iranians withdrew, and their imperial project in that strategically important region crumbled. Syria was liberated from a dictatorial regime, but the regional repercussions are far from over.