The Israeli war has witnessed a major escalation in geography, targets and firepower against Lebanon for more than a month. There is a real open escalation in time, after Lebanon replaced Gaza on the list of priorities in the Israeli war, which might put the world before the following options:
First: The continuation of the war, which is the policy of Netanyahu and his government, with controlled escalation and perhaps a reduction in certain stages, and an open war of attrition aimed at achieving Israel's main goals, which are to eliminate Hezbollah, and specifically to destroy its capabilities and capacities. remain soaring, such as eliminating the party's military card by completely destroying its military and security capabilities and others. One manifestation of these goals is that the Israeli war was practically envisaged against the Lebanese and Syrian arenas, in particular by destroying the capabilities of Hezbollah and its allies deep inside Syria, including bases and weapons depots. A war in which the factors that might push the parties capable of stopping it are still not present. These parties are not interested in the current context in completely stopping the Israeli attacks. For example, the United States does not oppose, as they meet with some of its regional goals, but not all of them. Western powers also meet with some of these goals, and are not inclined of influencing the Israeli position to a great extent.
Second: Slipping into an open Israeli war with Iran and its allies, extended from the Gulf to the Red Sea and to the Mediterranean coast. Such a war would change the face of the region and no one understands its dimensions or repercussions on the Middle Eastern strategic theater, as a whole. This scenario could happen despite Iran’s unwillingness to slip into a direct or open war on the one hand, and American pressure on the Israeli ally on the other hand, in order to keep its “deterrence operation” against Iran. A war that could lead to redrawing the areas of influence in the Middle East and could very much resemble the situation that emerged after the fall of Iraq in 2003, in terms of the size of the changes, their dimensions and their repercussions.
Third: Returning to the situation that prevailed in the south of Lebanon before the war, based or the "unwritten understanding" that governed the situation through the limited and selective implementation of Resolution 1701. This might be an arrangement that may carry a cosmetic formula from what was before and a condition to rebuilt the authority in Lebanon, and go to elect a president and form a government.
Fourth: The full implementation of Resolution 1701, which means the military removal of Hezbollah to the north of the Litany River with the army having full control over the area, and of course strengthening cooperation with UNIFIL. This alternative would make Hezbollah lose or greatly weaken its most important strategic card, which is the possession of the decision to heat up or cool down the front with its regional repercussions that are beneficial to it and its Iranian sponsor. This option requires an indirect agreement between the major supporters of the two parties in conflict, and a facilitating, motivating and accompanying a certain role from the concerned international and regional powers. A scenario that brings about a qualitative change in its nature and repercussions on the management of the conflict’s course with all its parties and complexities. Accordingly, Lebanon will no longer be an arena or a mailbox for exchanging messages between effective and influential external parties. This scenario could represents the beginning of the state’s return to assuming its national responsibilities as the decision-maker of war and peace. A decision in which the various Lebanese political components should participate by restoring the role of the state's authority inside all its institutions.