Every time the future of Hezbollah's weapons in Lebanon is raised, a complex scenery emerges, intertwined with politics, sectarianism, security, economy, historical memory, and future concerns. A careful reading of the continued delaying reveals that the issue goes beyond the security options, just as it goes beyond the war with Israel.
Every Hezbollah leader knows that those weapons have been ineffective in dealing real damage to Israel in a number of repeated clashes. The weapon in Hezbollah's hands is a tool to keep away accountability, which will come sooner or later, for the numerous crimes it has committed, both at home and abroad. Handing over this weapon will make the Party another political actor in the multifaceted Lebanese state, subject to the rule of law and its various institutions.
The world knows that the series of assassinations of prominent figures, such as Rafik Hariri, Gebran Tueni, Samir Kassir, Pierre Gemayel, and a long list of victims, were linked, whether certain or not, to Hezbollah security and military apparatus. Giving up weapons means implicit acceptance of the opening of international and local justice cases, a fact Hezbollah is aware of, and could lead to prosecution and perhaps the erosion of its political legitimacy. The Party justifies its adherence to arms by claiming to protect its community, but not all Lebanese Shiites are Hezbollah members. Therefore, talking about the sect in general is an exaggeration and an illusion, aimed at mobilizing the largest number of supporters. Hezbollah's refusal to surrender its weapons is also an attempt to perpetuate the sectarian power equation, keep the balance of power in its favour, and control the minds of ordinary people, convincing them that it is their unique protector.
Hezbollah makes its major decisions only in accordance with Iran's view. It seems that what is required is for Lebanon to remain an open arena for conflicts between regional parties. This card is being used for bargaining, regardless of the health of the Lebanese state. Disabling the Lebanese state is a mechanism to protect Hezbollah, and the more state institutions are disrupted and paralyzed, the more optimal the environment becomes for Party's continued impunity.
Handing over weapons would expose the Party's legitimacy before international and domestic law. The duality of "state and non-state" is one of the most dangerous consequences of this situation in Lebanon. In this environment, the legitimacy of institutions erodes, popular trust collapses, and the economy deteriorates, sinking into boiling crises.
Anyone who believes that Hezbollah will voluntarily surrender its weapons is ignorant, because for Hezbollah, weapons are not just rifles; they are means of escaping punishment and ensuring the continuation of its influence. Hezbollah will not disarm unless the regional balance of power changes radically, and international and regional powers force the Party to hand-over its weapons. What Hezbollah is using now is a pretext for stalling, sometimes citing the Israeli threat, sometimes the threat of a new civil war, and sometimes claiming that it is a defender of the Shiites. Therefore, it is a mistake for the Lebanese state to believe that it can, through persuasion, disarm Hezbollah. Rather, it needs radical actions, which would force this party to obey the rule of law.