When the Assad regime fell on January 8, 2024, it seemed as if the regime, with its institutions, apparatus, and individuals, was merely a melting lump of salt that had dissolved, leaving no trace of its former existence and reach. The collapse of the regime was not limited to the political structure represented by the administration of power (from the presidency to the smallest government structures), but also encompassed political groups, including the ruling Ba'ath Party and its allied parties within the National Progressive Front. The collapse and disappearance extended to popular organizations and unions, ranging from workers, farmers, and women to doctors, engineers, and teachers. These organizations, throughout the long Assad era, were considered pillars of the regime, and many of their cadres often took up arms when the situation required it.
The most important of the regime bodies that collapsed were the armed forces, which had been prepared and proclaimed as the first and main defender of the regime throughout nearly fifty-five years of Assad’s rule. The main part of them was managed by the Ministry of Defense, and a smaller part directly by the presidency. The second part of the armed forces was the security services, which, although they had administrative links to multiple bodies, especially the Ministries of Defense and Interior, their duties were linked to the National Security Office, which was managed by a person who reported directly to the head of the regime, who, constitutionally, held the position of Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, consolidating all powers in his hands.
The most important event was not the melting of the political and popular structures and the disappearance of their figures, despite the importance of some of them in the roles they played in the Assad regime’s policy. Rather, what was more important was the disappearance of the military and security leaders and cadres who played roles in the bloody war against the Syrians over the past fifteen years, killing, wounding, arresting and displacing millions of people, destroying their capabilities and plundering their money. How was it possible for tens, even hundreds of thousands, if we add to them the criminals and killers among the retirees, to all disappear as if they had never existed?
The danger posed by these army and security officers and personnel lies in their expertise and knowledge, their multifaceted and complex relationships and connections, their financial capabilities and weapons, and their connections to the regional and international spheres.
While a small portion of Assad's military and intelligence personnel left with him or after him, following the fall of the regime, the majority took refuge in their local incubators and nearby areas. Lebanon, Iraq, and the Kurdistan Region were a refuge or a route to other countries, while the majority of the rest sought one of two options: to live in hiding, and these are the political majority in particular, or to convert into sleeper cells of military and security personnel waiting for an opportunity to escape, or to participate in a movement that creates facts that rearrange the situation, whether in the areas where they reside or in areas suffering from political tensions and confusion.
Undoubtedly, the existence of sleeper cells of Assad's military and security personnel could gather around them some of the regime's civilian followers, associates, and out-lows, exploiting certain local or political events. This came to life practically at the beginning of the coastal events in March 2025, when they organized and directed operations against public security forces and peaceful civilians. This was the beginning of what became known as the "coast operations," which led to many casualties and losses and represented a threat to civil peace in Syria.
Just as the events on the coast were fuelled and expanded by Assad's remnants, the developments in Sweida have showed the role played by military personnel, security personnel, and instigators, in fuelling the clashes. This has exacerbated the number of casualties and material losses for all parties to the conflict. This situation could be repeated, in a more dire manner, in north-eastern Syria.
Circumstances, particularly political ones, have led to the emergence and growth of local conflicts in several regions, which Assad's remnants have exploited in order to expand the conflict's boundaries. We have three examples: the first is what happened on the coast, the second is what is happening in Sweida, and the third seems likely in north-eastern Syria.
This dangerous situation requires a Syrian awareness and imposes steps and measures from various parties, the least of which is to stop the campaigns of incitement and accusations of treason, open the doors to political settlements and solutions, and reduce risks to use weapons, which leads to losses that affect all Syrians without exception. They also obstruct Syria's restoration of its unity and reaching goals of overcoming the disastrous effects and repercussions of the Assad era.