Syria has occupied a central place in Iran's strategic and political interests over the past five decades. Certainly, Iran's interest in Syria is no less than Israel's, which is preoccupied with even the smallest details and issues related to the country. Furthermore, the United States, despite its varying global position and its contradictory relationships with both Iran and Syria, has a particularly interest in the latter. This interest became clearly apparent, after the fall of the Assad regime and the emergence of the new Syrian era.
It is natural that Syria would be affected by the involvement of the three parties in a fierce war, as is happening in Iran, and that the war would cast its shadow on Syria in all its internal and external dimensions.
Domestically, these effects began to manifest directly in the daily life, which are not only based on the realities of rising prices for goods, services, and commodities, but also on the deepening of existing poverty, unemployment, and inflation. The effects are also evident in the anxiety imposed by the atmosphere of war, as Syria, given its location and position, has become an arena for some aspects of the conflict, including the fall of missiles and drones, which have caused many Syrian casualties. For these reasons and others, the war is placing a heavy burden on the Syrian authorities domestically, including the influx of large numbers of refugees from Lebanon, whose arrival is difficult to accommodate and manage effectively, given the current circumstances in Syria.
Apart from the direct shadows, other burdens began to take shape as military operations continued due to the impact on international land, sea and air road networks, which hindered the movement of goods and people, disrupted supply programs, raised shipping and insurance costs, and led to a new massive migratory wave.
Externally, the most important consequence of the war is that it moved the Syrian issue to the margins of regional events, and pushed it outside the circle of interest of international and regional actors, which makes it vulnerable to negative effects for the future development line of Syria, and the normalization of domestic life.
Another aspects of the war's burdens on Syria are the military and security ones: in a war that automatically extended to Lebanon due to the presence of Hezbollah, and to Iraq, which has a network supporting Tehran, it became natural for the Syrian authorities to mobilize their military and security capabilities, not only in anticipation of interventions by Iran's proxies into Syria, but also to prevent them from providing support to the remnants of the Assad regime, who might infiltrate or be forced to flee from Lebanon.
In short, the American-Israeli war on Iran has cast a heavy shadow over Syria, both internally and externally, in the immediate and long term, and on many levels. This requires that the Syrian authorities take responsible measures and conduct a comprehensive assessment of the situation, not just dwelling on the shadow of the war and its repercussions. They must then move on to a primary and necessary task: restructuring Syrian policy in its orientations, relationships, and tools. This is not only because the Syrian situation is changing and shifting, but also because regional and international conditions are changing. Given its limited capabilities, Syria is less than able to endure and progress in the face of the fierce storms that the war will unleash if it continues.