Regional security in the Middle East is a real dilemma that has been searching for a solution since 1967 until today, and it requires a serious discussion because the scale of a crisis that has reached the point of danger, especially after the war waged by Israel against the people of Gaza. The crisis is clearly evident in the existing state of confusion among those searching for quick solutions, and a very few who are thinking about sustainable solutions, even in the medium term. Perplexing questions are circulating in the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defense, searching for an answer, from Gaza to Washington. The Western vision is no less ambiguous, but it would be interesting to explain the reasons for the confusion and ambiguity in the Arab world.
The first reason for the current state of confusion among the Arabs is the change in the impression about where the threat really lies and what it is in fact. The idea about the nature of threats to Arab national security has changed repeatedly since the rule of Gamal Abdel Nasser in Egypt until today, and the nature of the performance of the Arab countries and their internal institutions has also changed with it.
In the Nasser period, the idea of the enemy was focused on Israel, and there were two visions for building alliances to deal with this threat: The first perception is Nasserist, based on Arab nationalism and the unity of the Arab countries, namely that Arabism is the reservoir of thought and the popular incubator for confronting threats. The second perception was Faysaliah, in other words, what King Faysal bin Abdulaziz proposed in terms of expanding the circle to include the Islamic world, and the coordination tools were represented by the Arab League and the Organization of the Islamic Conference.
The nature of the threat among Arab countries changed on the day when Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait, in August 1990. The invasion of an Arab country by another Arab country imposed new concepts of the nature of the threat, especially among the smaller countries in the Arab group, and imposed new alliances on them to deal with this new type of threat.
The Gulf, led by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, sought to build a broad global coalition to liberate Kuwait from the Iraqi invasion. This coalition led by the United States liberated Kuwait, and was followed by a larger American presence in the region, with fixed military bases in Qatar and Kuwait.
Then the Arab Spring came in 2010-2011 to pose an internal threat to the structure of the Arab states and their ability to survive. Although the nature of the threat changed, the idea of security expanded. It was no longer just military, but included the social, economic, and political aspects that led to that big explosion. That is, security begins with the individual. This approach led many Arab countries to become self-reliant on their internal security, and to shrink the space for thinking about national security.
Then another threat appeared, represented by the protest movements, especially the armed ones, challenging the state’s legitimacy in that it is the only one controlling the tools of violence within its territories. Movements such as Hezbollah and Hamas emerged, various groups took shelter in Libya and Al-Houthi in Yemen, and we have seen some countries confused in defining their positions on these groups. While some condemn Hezbollah in Lebanon and Al-Houthi in Yemen under the pretext of threatening the state, we find them standing together in Sudan.
The difference between Arab arrangements for regional security and others in other regions of the world is that other regional alliances are based on the fact that there is a group of countries that share with each other a sense of the nature of the common threat and ways to deal with it. However, in the Arab world, the understanding of threats is divided and different, and there is no agreement about it. Therefore, each country addresses it separately within the framework of its understanding of its immediate and urgent security needs.
The present situation in Gaza revealed the gaps in Arab regional security in terms of its lack of continuity and fluctuations depending on the circumstances. There is an agreement on paper in the Arab League’s files about joint Arab defense, but when it will be activated and how could be done is something that has not been yet discussed. Still, a desire exists to save what can be saved in Gaza, but there is no tangible achievements.