The Libyan Structured Dialogue Committee concluded its meetings and presented recommendations copied from previous agreements, but offering nothing new. At the forefront of these recommendations is the formation of a new transitional government for a specific period not exceeding two years, for preparing the electoral process, postponing the constitution file, and adopting a "transitional constitutional framework."
Meanwhile, in the constitutional track, which has been stalled for many years, the participants proposed measures to regulate the transitional period and lead to elections, with the permanent constitution file to be referred to a later stage. But herein lies the postponement of the crisis and its bypassing, and even an extension of the transitional phases.
The Structured Dialogue Committee was chosen by the International Mission, and entrusted with the choice of the fate of the Libyan people who have been absent in political decision since 2011. It is a consultative forum that aims to bring together various political and social parties to discuss national issues in an organized manner, without being a decision-making body or an executive mechanism that is binding in itself. However, the International Mission is trying to make the outcomes of the structured dialogue “binding” on all Libyan parties, which is considered a serious deviation from the concept of a real dialogue.
The Libyan crisis continues, and those responsible for its continuation are well known. It is the political Islamist groups that control the capital, Tripoli, and the Central Bank, these groups constantly creating pretexts to perpetuate chaos and maintain their dominance over the capital.
Thus, the Libyan crisis is being dealt with by connecting the authority of the democratic electoral option with the option of a coup that lost the elections, as happened in the “Skhirat Dialogue,” which produced a hybrid parliament parallel to the elected parliament under the name of the “Consultative State Council.” This has contributed to exacerbating the issue and making it a permanent, recurring crisis, with interventions of multiple interests.
The United Nations Mission, from its first envoy, the Lebanese Tarek Mitri, to the Spaniel Bernardino Leon, used the stick and carrot principle, bringing the parties who refused dialogue into separate rooms and discussing the crisis upside down, by looking for a “consensus” government. Then came their successor, the German Martin Kobler, burdened with failure in Afghanistan and Iraq and with special visions, which made him a party to the conflict rather than a neutral mediator.
But to make the dialogue a success, they must return to the people and stop producing sterile, repetitive solutions. This is why it is needed local dialogue and consensus on it, not necessarily agreement, as diversity and difference are a natural result. Libyan are a people with a national will, and it will not allow a guardianship government to be imposed under the auspices of a foreign mandate.
Finally, it should be said that the "structured dialogue" failed to end the open transitional phases, and its outcomes are no different from the “Skhirat Agreement” or the “Geneva Agreement,” all of which proving their failure to address the Libyan crisis. The biggest challenge for the outcomes of this type of dialogue remains the transition from paper to implementation, and this is difficult to achieve in light of the disregard for the active forces on the ground, and also in the existence of a parallel track led by other foreign powers.