March 15 is conventionally considered the anniversary of the Syrian revolt outburst. That day, around fifty people demonstrated in silence in front of the governor's palace in Daraa. On Friday March 18, a larger gathering took place outside the mosque, but this time it left two people dead. The funeral was attended by thousands of people and it was the start of a series of repressed demonstrations and clashes between the population of Daraa and the regime. The wind of revolt spread throughout Syria. Millions of Syrians took the streets to demand a change of government, as in Tunisia and Egypt. However, the process was not the same as in these two countries, because of a rapid islamization of the rebellion (which frightened the minorities), a system in power more resilient than expected and powerful international risks.
Thirteen years later, what assessment can be made? On the human level, there were 350,000 deaths according to the UN, 8 million people are refugees abroad and 6 million are internally displaced, out of a total of 26 million Syrians in 2024.
Syria is divided into four main entities: the regime, which controls 2/3 of the country and around 11 million inhabitants; Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, the Syrian branch of al-Qaeda, created an Islamic emirate in Idlib, on 3,000 km2, for 2.5 million Syrians; Türkiye occupies a discontinuous strip of territory in the north, with 1.5 million inhabitants from which it has expelled the Kurdish population, and controlled by the so-called Syrian National Army (SNA); Finally, the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES), where 3 million people reside under the protection of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) supported by the United States. Additionally, it is to be mentioned the American base at al-Tanef in the southeast of the Syrian desert.
Since the date of the regime's last offensive against Idlib, the front lines have not moved and it seems that the partition of the country is lasting. But, the image of a frozen conflict is confusing, because the regime has not given up on the regaining of the entire territory. For this, it needs the agreement of Russia and Iran (which provide it with major military resources) to negotiate with Türkiye and to obtain the departure of American troops from the AANES.
Because of the war in Ukraine, Russia has been sparing Türkiye and thus enjoys its benevolent neutrality. This means that the Syrian regime is not allowed to invade Idlib and the territories under Turkish control. The United States also does not want to get angry with the Turks, because they need their positive collaboration within NATO. This explains why Washington lets Ankara destroy AANES infrastructure and strike the FDS with its drones.
But at present, the most serious threat to the AANES comes from Iran, which has been harassing American troops in Syria and Iraq, officially in retaliation for American support for Israel since the start of the war in Gaza. The American bombings in Iraq on the Shiite militias ended up by pushing the Iraqi government, under the influence of Tehran, to demand an end to the mission of the International Coalition against Daesh. A bilateral military agreement between Washington and Baghdad is currently being negotiated, but it is not certain that it will succeed and especially that the United States will be able to maintain a powerful presence in Iraq, which would also call into question the American military presence in northeastern Syria.
In May 2023, Bashar al-Assad was reinstated into the Arab League. This means that he has no longer anything to fear from Saudi Arabia and Qatar, which largely supported in the past the Syrian rebellion. In March 2023, Riyadh and Tehran concluded a diplomatic agreement under the auspices of Beijing, for reducing tensions between the two countries. Iran forbids the Houthis from launching missiles at Saudi Arabia and the latter abandons Lebanon, Syria and Iraq to Tehran, no longer supporting the Sunnis there.
Eight million Syrians have left the country since 2011 and there are still many candidates for exile, because it is difficult to see an improvement in living conditions, quite the contrary. On the one hand, the conflict is only frozen, but not over, so there is great concern about a resumption of the fighting, particularly in areas out of Damascus' control. On the other hand, the Syrian regime is applying a strategy of massive political purge which it considers essential to its survival. The 2011 revolt was powerful because the Sunni Arab hostile majority, to the detriment in particular of more favorable religious minorities (Allawite, Christian, Druze, Ismaili, etc.). Among the Sunni Arabs, the share of secularists has been reduced in favor of the Islamists, who are much more prolific, which explains the support that Daesh and the Al-Nusra Front were able to find in a part of the Syrian population converted to Islamist ideology. The fact that eight million Syrians, three-quarters of whom are Sunni Arabs, have left Syria strengthens the influence of the loyalists. This is also one of the reasons why the North-West will undoubtedly remain under Turkish domination, because the 4 million Sunni Arabs and Turkmens, pro-opposition and Islamists, would constitute a threat to the stability of the Syrian regime.
Finally, Syrian refugees are a resource for the regime, thanks to the money they transfer to their families for surviving. It is estimated that the million Syrians in Europe send 2 to 3 billion euro back to Syria each year and this is the country's main source of foreign currency.
After 13 years of active or frozen conflict, Syrians aspire to peace and a decent life. Unfortunately, the conditions to achieve this are not met, whether internally or externally. The world has entered into a confrontation between the West and the new Eurasian bloc dominated by Russia, China and Iran, as during the Cold War. Syria is on this axis of crises between the two blocs and constitutes a theater of military confrontation. The poverty that reigns in the country provides the belligerents with thousands of potential combatants, young men without work and without hope, for whom the war represents an income and a chance for social prestige. The masters of the war economy, incapable of retraining in formal activities, have an interest in maintaining a state of permanent conflict, the source of their wealth and their power. In the meantime, Syria joins the group of failed states with a constant instability.