The recent strike on the southern suburbs of Beirut, the Hezbollah's stronghold, confirmed that this military and political group has been defeated in its war with Israel. For the fourth time since the ceasefire, the suburb has been subjected to shelling, preceded by a humiliating exodus.
This defeat is no less significant than other historical turning points in Lebanon, such as the Lebanese Civil War (1975-1990) or the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982 to expel the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and Yasser Arafat from Beirut. It places the Lebanese state before a historic responsibility: to consolidate the political outcomes of this turning point, for the revival of Lebanon, its societal peace, economy, and services, after decades of Hezbollah's control over it.
The reality is that the state has no choice but to take the first and most urgent step, namely disarming Hezbollah, before considering anything else. This means, among other things, ending the duality of arms in Lebanon, which has wasted the national resources of state sovereignty and undermined its ability to enforce law and order. This will not happen through rhetoric about arms monopoly unless the rhetoric is accompanied by a timetable, a clear, publicly announced implementation plan for disarmament.
Ending Hezbollah's possession of weapons is not merely a technical measure, but rather a profound political transformation aimed at achieving a genuine liberation of Lebanon from this party's weapons.
Such a path requires strong political will from the Lebanese state and its leadership, supported by international and regional pressure, and an awareness of the reality of the political dynamics in the region.
Whoever advises Lebanon's official position on attempting to intervene in the dispute between Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and US President Donald Trump, and to exploit this in the Lebanese equation, is a party that has not taken note of all the strategic changes taking place in the region. Without addressing the political consequences of Hezbollah's military defeat, the door will not be opened to addressing the devastating social and economic consequences of the country.
In contrast, Hezbollah is investing in its past glories and achievements to maintain the loyalty of its base during critical times. It is betting on the possibility of the new equation in Syria collapsing to exploit the chaos, rebuild its influence, weapons, and finances, and restore its umbilical cord with Iran. While its success in adapting to the crises in Lebanon and the region is not guaranteed, this does not absolve the state of responsibility for losing this opportunity, accelerating the mechanisms aimed at besieging it through internal pressure and international supervision, and disrupting its pragmatism, which relies on patience and chaos as tools for its survival.
At the present time, there is an real opportunity not only to heal Lebanon's wounds, but also to transform Hezbollah's defeat into the beginning of a genuine national Lebanese renaissance.