Middle East is entering a pivotal moment, approaching a long-delayed historic decision, amid the gradual collapse of a totalitarian axis fuelled by ideology, militias, and the export of crises. The regional project, which has invested for years in chaos and proxy control, has begun to decline, not only under the weight of regional and international pressures, but also due to the internal erosion of its tools and networks. Repetitive slogans and militia power are no longer capable of producing stability or building true sovereignty. Instead, they have become a burden on peoples and an obstacle to modernization and institutional reforms, which have become an unavoidable option.
In the face of this vacuum, moderate states, led by Saudi Arabia, are advancing an alternative model that presents a comprehensive security and development approach which transcends circumstantial solutions or put aside ideological rhetoric. This vision has produced a proactive approach, in which policies are built on managing the vacuums left by the withdrawal of international players, particularly in Syria and Lebanon, and on dismantling the logic of dependency, which has been the most prominent feature of the Iranian project since its beginning.
In this context, the ongoing transformations in Lebanon and Syria can only be understood as part of this transition toward a new Middle East. In Lebanon, despite the continued failure to build a centralized state, Hezbollah's structure has begun to undergo unprecedented erosion, a result of a new regional security equation imposed by realities rather than old balances. With the election of a Lebanese political leadership more aligned with the state's logic, and the emergence of explicit international support, southern Lebanon is translating from an arena of Iranian influence into a true testing ground for the feasibility of a new, citizenship-based restructuring.
In contrast, Syria is currently engaged in a dual battle: confronting the remnants of ISIS and restructuring state institutions in a highly complex process, both in absorbing all components and in eliminating the state's revolutionary status. The issue of foreign fighters is at the forefront of this struggle, and the new Syrian authorities try to contain Syrians without discrimination.
This scenario is eroded by the vacuum left by the US withdrawal and the declining ability of local partners, particularly the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), to control prisons and camps housing thousands of militants and their families. In this context, ISIS remains no longer a local matter, but rather a regional threat requiring multilateral coordination, especially given the security vulnerability in areas such as Deir ez-Zorr and its surroundings. The success of eradication process of ISIS remains contingent on Damascus's ability to demonstrate competence and commitment, particularly in managing the prison and camp situation, and achieving some sort of understanding with the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), not based on exclusion or elimination, but rather through realistic cooperation in Syria's interests.
We are facing a historic test of the Middle East's ability to produce its own security and political equations from within its own capabilities, free from hegemony or foreign interventions. If Lebanon can restore state institutions without submitting to the logic of parallel arms and sub-state entities, and if Syria, too, confronts the challenge of redrawing its security priorities through partnership, not exclusion, then we will be witnessing a new Middle East that does not resemble the old maps, but rather transcends them toward a pragmatic reality more capable of resilience and partnership.