The scenario created by the 2011 revolutions in North Africa and the Arab Levant forced Moscow to rethink its role in the region. In May 2012, with Putin's return to the presidency of the Federation, Russia fully returned to Middle Eastern affairs. After a failed attempt to mediate the Libyan crisis, the Russian leader set up a more assertive foreign policy, totally opposed to that of NATO. The first change of course took place in August 2012 in the hall of the United Nations Security Council, where Turkey and the United States were discussing the possibility of putting a no-fly zone to a vote for the Levantine country as well; this time, however, foreign minister Sergey Lavrov, mindful of what happened in Libya, communicated to the Western chancelleries that Moscow would veto the resolution, blocking the initiative in the bud.
In the same period Russia activated, together with Iran, supply lines to help the Syrian regime, now close to collapse due to international isolation and the advance of the armed opposition and the Salafi jihadist groups who had taken advantage of the chaos generated by penetrate the country and create "quasi-states" in the extreme north-east of Syria and in the governorate of Idlib. Vessels loaded with weapons, ammunition, fuel, medicines and basic necessities sailed from Sevastopol which, landing in the Syrian port of Laodicea, allowed the regime to survive and to preserve vital territories from a political and military point of view. As time went on, the Russian engagement in Syria would become increasingly continuous and structured,
On 12 February 2013, Putin signed the update of the foreign policy document, the Foreign Policy Concept which, while following the provisions of the previous editions, underlined the need to adopt an increasingly multipolar foreign policy, characterized by respect for independence and for the sovereignty of states. To cope with local chaos and crises, the traditional use of soft power had to be integrated with hard , coercive power.
For the president, the proof that the Western approach was no longer a model to follow was given by the failure of the Arab Spring, which had not only been unable to democratize institutions from below, but had caused their collapse, favoring consequently the rise of Salafist and jihadist movements (including Jabhat al-Nusra and the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria) and the clash between ethnic groups and religious denominations. The Russian method was based, on the contrary, on a top-down security approach, aimed at stabilizing countries devastated by wars and unrest through the government of "strong men", often coming from the army.
This vision was reflected in the partnership with 'Abd al-Fattah al-Sisi, the Egyptian army general who, with the July 2013 coup, had put an end to the political experience of President Mohammed Morsi, an expression of the Muslim Brotherhood.
In the days of the Crimean crisis, the Third Inter-ministerial Meeting between Russia and the Gulf Cooperation Council was also held in Kuwait. Although the summit did not obtain appreciable results, it was an excellent opportunity to improve relations with the richest and most developed countries of the Middle East, especially after the isolation and the sanctions applied following the annexation of the Black Sea peninsula. However, the agreement with Iran in supporting Assad and the contacts maintained with the Yemeni Houthi rebels had caused some tension with Qatar and Saudi Arabia - with the former it even came close to the diplomatic incident - which, on the other hand, supported (and financed ) the more radical Syrian oppositions close to Salafism. It was necessary to wait for the visit to St. Petersburg of the future Saudi crown prince Mohammed bin Salman, in the second half of June 2015, to formalize the rapprochement between the two states.
A few months after the St. Petersburg meeting, on 30 September 2015, Russia entered directly into the Syrian conflict with a series of aerial bombings on rebel positions in Idlib and Aleppo. The intervention was presented as the response to a precise request for assistance presented by the Syrian government, but in reality it had much deeper reasons. First, it revived Russia's ambitions as a great (super)power, capable of restoring the status quo and order after the chaos caused, according to the Russian vision, by NATO. Secondly, the campaign served to divert attention from the annexation of Crimea and, above all, to test the level of strength of the army, from training conscripts to using new generation weapons and means. Finally, there were reasons of an essentially geopolitical nature, such as the aforementioned historical alliance with Damascus and the fight against jihadist terrorism. To these was added the defense of the naval base located in the port of Tartus which, established in 1971 as part of a Syrian-Soviet agreement, constituted the extreme southern outpost of the Russian fleet.
Thanks to the (not disinterested) help of Moscow, the Syrian regime passed, in the space of two years, from a defensive attitude to an offensive one, reconquering the main urban centers of the country, including Aleppo and Ghuta, to then annex a large part of the rural territories rich in mineral resources previously occupied by ISIS.
The Syrian campaign involved a greater degree of cooperation with the other external actor in the conflict, Turkey, which sided with a part of the rebels. Although the geopolitical confrontation had caused strong tensions - including those that followed the shooting down of a Russian Sukhoi by a Turkish jet in November 2015 - the two countries managed to find a modus vivendi, recognizing their respective spheres of influence: Ankara it effectively recognized Assad's sovereignty over two thirds of the Arab country, but in exchange it was free to increase its control, both direct and indirect, over the northern territories populated by the Kurdish minority, considered by President Erdogan as a threat to national security.
The two countries found themselves on opposite sides even in the Libyan crisis. Ankara sided with the Government of National Salvation of Tripoli (replaced in 2016 by the Government of National Unity recognized by the UN) while Moscow supported the "strong man" of Cyrenaica, General Khalifa Haftar who in May 2014 had transferred to Tobruq the parliament formed following the elections not recognized by the GSN, starting a new civil war.
In the light of what has been seen, providing an overall assessment of Russian (geo)politics in the Middle East is not easy. The 2016 update of the Foreign Policy Concept defines the modus operandi of the Federation as «transparent, predictable, pragmatic» and in line with the rules and principles of international law, but the reality is quite different. The country violated the territorial sovereignty of an independent state, Ukraine, in 2014 and 2022, while it has extensively interfered in the internal affairs of Syria and Libya without coordinating with international organizations. The Russians have not been able to propose peaceful and feasible solutions in the theaters of war or crises in which they have intervened, on the contrary they have often contributed to increasing the level of chaos and violence by supporting military rather than political, civilian or impartial figures.
On the other hand, it should be noted that the Kremlin's action has been decisive in weakening terrorist movements and in maintaining the balance of power between the various regional players, to the point of pushing some analysts to define his attitude as opportunistic and predatory. More generally, Russia plays a crucial role for the Middle East in many respects, from military assistance to energy and food supplies.
The war in Ukraine has demonstrated the high degree of (inter)dependence that binds the Arab countries and Moscow, starting with Syria. The country has been the "training ground" of the Russian army for eight years which, as we have seen above, has put its tactical and logistical skills to the test, many of which have been redeployed in the Donbass area. The regime has "reciprocated" the relief provided in the war by organizing a battalion of Syrian mercenaries who took part in the invasion together with the Russian forces, without however
obtaining appreciable results. Damascus has also used its diplomatic "weight", voting in the General Assembly of the United Nations, unique among the Arab states, in favor of annexation and officially recognizing the republics of Donetsk and Lugansk. Regardless of the effectiveness of these actions, the conflict damages the interests of Assad who sees his main sponsors, Moscow and Tehran, weakening due to the diplomatic, economic, even political and social crises that have arisen in recent months.
Other and far more influential states fall into the category of "non-hostile countries", Saudi Arabia, has maintained an equidistant, not to say ambiguous, position on the conflict: on the one hand it has condemned the "special operation", but on the other it has deemed the Federation's security concerns, comparable to those of the United in the Yemeni conflict. Even more significant is the energy issue, on which Russia, Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf States play a large part of their regional and international power politics.
Even Israel, after the initial solidarity expressed with Ukraine and with President Zelensky, has remained rather neutral: on the one hand, Prime Minister Yair Lapid strongly criticized the Russian intervention and expressed solidarity with the Ukrainian people; on the other, the government headed by him refused to supply Kiev with its "Iron Dome" missile system, provoking an indignant reaction from Zelensky, who accused the country of having strengthened the Russian-Iranian partnership in this way. Indeed, military aid from Tel Aviv would jeopardize relations with Moscow, which have become strategic with the long-standing partnership between Putin and Netanyahu. The latter's return to power after the November elections could strengthen, at least in part, relations with Moscow, necessary for the containment of Iranian influence in Syria, as well as for the specific weight played by the Russian-speaking Jewish community, the largest of the Middle East, in the social and demographic balance of Israel.
Turkey presented itself as a moderator by organizing a series of meetings and negotiations in order to resolve, if not the conflict, at least the energy and food crises resulting from the block on exports of wheat and hydrocarbons. President Erdogan's initiative and the geographical position of the country which controls the routes between the Black and Mediterranean seas meant that Turkish diplomacy assumed a fundamental role in the affair. At the same time Erdogan could use the large margins of maneuver granted to redefine the economic agreements with the European Union and resume military operations in northern Syria. It is difficult to foresee the evolution of the dynamics described above, but it is evident that they are already modifying the statu quo created in recent years in the enlarged Mediterranean. As we have seen, the Kremlin is betting on the creation of a new multipolar international order. Several Arab countries, in particular Saudi Arabia and the Emirates seem to have adopted this vision, distancing themselves from Washington's addresses, as demonstrated, among other things, by the Jeddah July 2022 summit and the recent decision by OPEC+, more symbolic than substantial, to reducing crude oil production, and moving on the basis of what they perceive as their own best interests.