In December 2021, Libya’s Electoral Commission decided that polls could not take place for numerous reasons, and the presence of foreign forces on Libyan soil was undeniably one of the mains.
Even with some mercenaries from countries in the Sahel departing recently from Libya, nothing suggests that either Turkey’s military or Russia’s Wagner Group will quit the country in the foreseeable future and for two main motives: firstly, the Turks and Russians have too much to gain from staying in Libya, and secondly, they have little incentive to leave under current circumstances because the only power in the world that could potentially use its leverage to pressure Turkish and Russian forces to depart is the United States. But it is unlikely for the US to act in such a manner.
Washington is not interested in Libya, especially at this time when there are far more pressing problems as disputes with Russia on Ukraine, North Korea, China and, above all, the massive internal problems that the Biden administration is facing. Experts assert that US administration doesn’t have a real strategy for Libya and when it talks about addressing the issue of foreign actors’ presence in Libya, it’s not to be taken seriously because it’s not doing anything really.
Within this context, there is every reason to expect armed Turkish and Russian personnel to remain in Libya, until circumstances become significantly different. The US sees the Turkish military’s presence in the North African country as the best outcome that Washington could realistically expect. United States is aware of its own lack of determination in its efforts to force Russia to leave because it knows that Russia is going to stay, and it is imperiously needed a mechanism to contain potential expansion of the Russian presence.
Member states of the European Union have high stakes in Libya’s future and the presence of both Turkish and Russian forces in the North African country is deeply troubling European powers. France is particularly at odds with the US perspective on Turkish and Russian forces in Libya, as Paris sees that the Turkish role there is more problematic than the Wagner Group’s presence. Resentment towards Turkey’s presence in Libya has also augmented in Italy too, especially in the far-right political scene that consider Libya as Italy’s back yard, also through a neo-colonial perspective.
Beyond issues stemming from economic competition, there are security issues that give EU members reason to perceive the Turkish and Russian hard power in Libya as threatening national interests of European powers. Finally, whoever has power over the Libyan coast controls migration flows and this is a strategic issue that Brussels should not underestimate.
In the final analysis, Turkey and Russia have proved to be the main external kingmakers in Libya and their presence has provoked major divisions among Western states. Moscow will take advantage of these divisions as Russia continues its “return” to African countries that were once under strong Soviet influence, including Libya.