The second round of talks in Washington between Lebanon and Israel did not lead to a decisive breakthrough, but it opened a political path that was not available a few months earlier. It is true that the prolonged ceasefire remains fragile and that the south is still under pressure.
What we are witnessing is not the result of a sudden shift in the political stance on peace, but rather a new security reality. The obstacle posed by Hezbollah, which paralyzed the Lebanese state for decades, has begun to weaken. With this, the veto that monopolized decisions on war and peace, transforming Lebanon into an open front serving agendas beyond its own interests, has begun to recede.
Therefore, the real challenge has become Lebanon's ability to act as a state controlling its own decisions, borders, and security. It is clearly paradoxical that the party that has monopolized war and peace decisions outside the state for years is now calling for a national consensus on negotiations.
Discussing opportunities for peace between Lebanon and Israel doesn't appear to be solely in Israel's interest. Lebanon's primary interest is to move away from the logic of a permanent front. The Lebanese people's interest lies in security decisions resting with the state and the army, not with an armed organization linked to an external leadership.
The region's interest lies in separating Lebanon from the regional war and preventing Tehran from using its territory as a bargaining chip. Lebanon's stability is no longer solely a Lebanese issue but is part of a broader stability within its Syrian and Arab environment, and also a matter of Gulf security, in the face of the logic of proxies and militias that disregard truces and sovereignty.
Any realistic assessment of the situation must link security and development. Lebanon, without a militia holding the reins of war and peace, becomes more likely to attract Arab investment, particularly from the Gulf, and better able to restore tourism, services, and financial confidence.
The opening of a negotiation horizon, however fragile, reduces the cost of risks and puts Lebanon back into the calculations for investment and reconstruction. Lebanon's security is also linked to Syria's security and vice versa, while Hezbollah's continued existence as a transnational armed organization means keeping both countries in an environment of infiltration, smuggling, and disorder.
Israel enters this process with a clear military advantage, and its calculations still raise serious questions in light of its insistence on a buffer zone. The Lebanese state still faces Hezbollah, absent from the negotiating table but present on the ground. For this reason, the realistic limit in the current phase may be a temporary security agreement, or broader arrangements that will pave the way for something more substantial later on.
Despite all these constraints, the bigger picture is clearer than ever. True peace in Lebanon does not begin with the form of an agreement or the name of a process, but from the day Hezbollah's monopoly on the decision of war and peace ends, and Lebanon becomes a fully sovereign state again, no longer ruled by a militia or used as a battleground for the wars of others, but returning to the path of stability and development.