The dilemma of the conflict in Lebanon is that it will not end simply with a ceasefire, but also - and perhaps primarily - will deal with activists and fans of “Hezbollah” who have expressed their discontent for the repeated displacement, and have sometimes criticized the party, holding it responsible for all what happened.
In fact, the question that must be asked after the end of the war will not only be a security question, but will be primarily a social, political, and anthropological one about the history of the Lebanese sects, their role, and the nature of the Lebanese system since the country’s independence and before, in order to “decode” the uniqueness of Hezbollah's experience that broke the equation of consensus and mutual deterrence between the Lebanese components, in favor of an armed model which has dominated political and military decision-making for decades.
Hence, the question will become: Where will Hezbollah’s internal energy go? What will the 90 percent of the party’s members who are not fighting Israel do, and against whom will they turn after the war ends? Implementing the indispensable decision to get the state exclusively control weapons will not be easy, and what will be even more difficult is transforming Hezbollah’s body into one that resembles the rest of the Lebanese institutions that are characterized by diversity and often political disagreement.
Anyone interested in Lebanese affairs will be astonished by the force of penetration of the “Hezbollah” project into a segment of the Lebanese population over more than a quarter of a century, and how the party’s weapons have transformed from a liberation tool against the Israeli occupation in 2000 into a hegemony force, control, and dragging the country and its people into wars for the benefit of others.
There is no doubt that the challenge of implementing the decision to put weapons exclusively in the hands of the state is difficult, but the challenge of transforming Hezbollah’s body is the most difficult, but not impossible. This does not mean that they should speak like the rest of the Lebanese, nor that they should have the same political stance, but rather that they should be convinced that weapons will not bring status or superiority.
We must remember that a small country like Lebanon, through all its sects, has produced great politicians, artists, and writers. It also has a cross-sectarian culture based on trade, services, and tourism, and has produced creative people in all fields who have competed with established countries in the region whose population is more than ten times that of Lebanon.
The truth is that the country will need an integrated economic, political, and cultural vision to deal with this situation, and how to rehabilitate and integrate the non-combatant elements of Hezbollah into state institutions. Also, it has to find alternative financial revenues to those that were pouring in from Iran to the party and its civilian institutions, and to foresee what is the future of the ideologically driven combatant elements who hold a different value system than the Lebanese army?
But the hope still exists that Lebanon is capable of overcoming these issues if everyone has the will, and if the Lebanese want to focus on building their country, which has been ravaged by wars.