The first UN Security Council resolution against the invasion of Ukraine was proposed on February 25, and the United Arab Emirates, a key US ally, abstained, subsequently issuing public statements which some have been interpreted as considering the accusations set forth by Russia as legitimate. Three days later, the Arab League, which groups 22 Arab states, issued a statement that did not condemn Russia's invasion and offered little support for Ukrainians.
A few days later, however, the situation had changed. When the UN General Assembly resolution condemning Russia passed overwhelmingly, it was backed by the United Arab Emirates, as well as Saudi Arabia and Egypt, two of the strongest and powerful Arab states. It was clear that Western pressure, and more particularly American, has done its work. But given the alignment of nearly the entire Arab political elite with DC, and with the West in general, why was such pressure necessary? Especially for such a flagrant case of violation of state sovereignty, which even the most dictatorial autocrats in the region are keen to defend?
There is only one Arab leader who is truly pro-Putin: the Assad regime in Syria. All other Arab states generally favor their ties with the West, and none try to turn to Moscow. But it does not mean that the Arab states are hostile to Kremlin. They generally see Russia as an important world power that continues to matter in their region, and sometimes intervenes in a way that serves their interests.
Thus, the complex reactions of the Arab states to the invasion of Ukraine concern Russia far less than the West. Over the past decade, Arab leaders have had a growing sense that the West is an unreliable partner. This is partly due to their autocratic expectation that the West would support Western-allied autocrats like the Egyptian Hosni Mubarak during the 2011 Arab uprisings, a stance that would frankly have been consistent with Western policy up to then and since.
But there is also a keen awareness that the West in general, and the United States in particular, has not shown the will to hold its own in several theatres: from the so-called 'red line' in Syria to chemical weapons in 2013, to Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014, to the chaotic abandonment of Afghanistan in 2021. Many Arab leaders also note with concern that the "pivot to Asia" of America is a pivot away from the Arab region.
In the early days of the Russian invasion, it was clear that the Arab states wanted to keep their options as open as possible, and not alienate Moscow if they didn't need to. That doesn't make them pro-Moscow; this means that they believe the world is becoming more and more multi-polar and that the West has not given much guidance on the price to pay for trying to be “relatively neutral”.
The situation has changed. The West has warned that Russian invasion is not a case where 'neutrality' will work, at least not if states want to maintain the same kind of close relationship between Arabs and Westerners that has characterized most ties so far. The Arab states know that if they want to continue their modernization efforts – in terms of technical developments, technology and investments – there is currently no substitute to the West.
Russia's attack on Ukraine has placed governments in the Middle East region in a strategically delicate position. Almost all of them have developed their relations with Moscow over the past decade, both in response to Russia's return to the region as a major external power (via its military intervention in Syria), and to adapt to the geopolitical reality of an increasingly multi-polar world in which the United States and its European allies no longer seem willing to guarantee regional security.
This somewhat explains why most Middle Eastern states have been so slow to formulate their position vis-à-vis Russia and its war. The only immediate reactions to the crisis came from Kuwait, which condemned Russia's actions and the Assad regime in Syria, which has supported Moscow by recognizing the separatist regions of Lugansk and Donetsk.
The vote of the United Nations General Assembly on March 2, 2022, brought a little more clarity as to the reaction of regional states: almost all Arab states, as well as Israel and Turkey, approved the resolution which “deplores in the strongest terms” Russia's “aggression against Ukraine”; only Algeria, Iraq, Iran and Sudan abstained. However, even among the countries that voted in favor of the resolution, most continued to choose their words very carefully, refraining from explicitly condemning Russia's actions.
The UAE's reluctance to take sides has received the most attention, mainly because it is the only country in the Middle East to hold a seat on the United Nations Security Council. His abstention from the February 26, 2022 resolution demanding an immediate halt to the Russian attack on Ukraine, caused consternation in Washington, London, Paris and many other Western capitals.
One explanation for Abu Dhabi's decision is that it wanted to retain Moscow's goodwill for a resolution the Council adopted two days later, in which the Yemeni Houthis - who recently fired ballistic missiles and explosive drones over the Emirates – were explicitly described as a “terrorist group”; Russia abstained, allowing the resolution to pass. Like many of its neighbors, the UAE sees the war in Ukraine as a European conflict, while the Iran-backed Houthis pose a direct threat to its national security. Nevertheless, to officially designate the Houthis as a terrorist organization, the UAE will need the support of Washington and other Western capitals.
The difficulty of reacting to developments in Ukraine without jeopardizing their friendly relations with Moscow has highlighted a dilemma for many Arab states. In their own region, they are ardent defenders of the principles of sovereignty and non-interference, norms they have accused Iran of breaking over the past two decades, just as Russia is now doing in Ukraine.
It is true that many Arab leaders were able to manage the superpower rivalry during the Cold War and, although painful, the loss of ties with Russia may not have dramatic consequences in the short term. However, like Western politicians who fear that China will follow Russia's example and attack Taiwan, Arab states fear they will one day be faced with a dire choice between the United States, their main security partner, and China, the region's main trading partner. The countries of the region are therefore well aware that the search for a balance between world powers – as uncomfortable as it is – is something that they have to get used to.