The new Iraqi government took office in Baghdad at a time of sharp national and regional turmoil. This government assumes its duties at a critical crossroads, facing a critical test: either it will pursue comprehensive structural reforms—including concrete engagement with non-state armed groups embedded within state institutions—or it will risk sliding into a wide confrontation between the United States and armed groups, which could have violent consequences for the state itself.
There is no doubt that the ongoing tensions between the United States and Iran have placed Iraq in a precarious position. While Iraq is not a direct party to the confrontation, it is not a passive observer either; rather, it has become an arena where regional and international rivalries converge. Furthermore, Iraq's reliance on American security support, coupled with Iran's deep political, economic, and military influence, creates a structurally complex environment and represents one of the most significant challenges facing the new government.
Over the past few weeks, US bases in Iraq have been subjected to hundreds of drone and missile attacks, mostly carried out by Iranian-backed armed groups operating under the name “Islamic Resistance in Iraq.” These operations have severely damaged vital military and diplomatic infrastructure in Iraq, underscoring the growing operational capabilities of non-state actors within the country.
The Kurdistan Region of Iraq has not been spared from these attacks; in fact, it has been a primary target, suffering nearly 500 airstrikes during the same period. Notably, over 60 percent of these strikes were launched by Iranian-backed factions within the Iraqi Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF). These attacks have caused significant damage to energy infrastructure, Peshmergah facilities, and civilian areas in Iraqi Kurdistan, resulting in at least 25 deaths, including civilians, Peshmergah fighters, and members of Iranian Kurdish opposition groups.
The Kurdistan Region of Iraq lacks the capacity to independently secure its airspace or deploy sophisticated air defense systems. Effective air protection (provided by the United States and European countries) remains largely confined to the city of Erbil, where US military and diplomatic facilities are located. Outside this limited area, critical infrastructure throughout the region remains highly vulnerable to frequent attacks.
At the same time, the Iraqi government and key Shia actors within the coordination framework have not unequivocally condemned these attacks, nor have they taken any effective measures to prevent them. This inaction could exacerbate internal tensions and is likely to lead to greater political and security repercussions in the near term.
Baghdad's limited ability to deal with armed groups reflects a deeper structural reality. Some of these groups are deeply entrenched within the state itself, and their influence extends throughout the Iraqi political system, including the legislative, executive, and judicial branches.
These dynamics profoundly affect the state's relationship with armed factions, Baghdad-Erbil relations, and Iraq's international partnerships. The presence of armed groups operating outside the state's effective control undermines confidence in Baghdad's authority and complicates its ability to fulfill its constitutional obligations or implement agreements. The result is a cycle of recurring political, security, and economic crises.
Even more alarming is the growing risk of a direct confrontation between the United States and Iraqi armed groups. While the U.S. response has thus far been measured, the potential for escalation into a broader campaign—targeting militia leadership, infrastructure, and drone capabilities—remains significant, regardless of the outcome of U.S.-Iranian negotiations.
Regionally, the repercussions are no less significant. Drone attacks launched by groups affiliated with the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) against neighboring countries, particularly the Gulf states, Jordan, and Syria, have extended the reach of Iraq’s internal divisions beyond its borders, altering the Arab world’s perception of Iraq. As long as armed groups have the ability to use Iraqi territory for coercion, retaliation, or sending messages, Baghdad will find it difficult to present itself as a sovereign and trustworthy partner.
Looking ahead, Iraq faces a combination of risks, including escalation, institutional erosion, and economic stagnation. Progress will depend on a gradual decrease of tensions and radical institutional reforms, particularly in clarifying command and control structures. However, given the entrenched position of non-state actors with transnational connections, implementing genuine reforms will be complex and arduous.
The Iraqi federal government must pursue a two-pronged approach: gradually strengthening its control over armed groups through political agreements while maintaining strong and credible control. Without tangible reforms, Iraq’s political and security dynamics could turn toward widespread confrontation and institutional collapse.