Since President Mahmoud Abbas issued a decrees to hold legislative elections in November of this year, a intense debate has erupted among Palestinians, beginning with the question: Will the elections actually take place, or are their anouncement merely a maneuver to defuse internal tensions? Without a definitive answer to this question, an active process of preparing for the elections has begun through consultations and understandings regarding the formation of electoral lists, as if the elections will inevitably be held within a short period.
Between the last elections held in 2006 and the scheduled November elections, developments occurred that brought about profound and powerful changes in the Palestinian situation. The largest and most dangerous division in the history of the Palestinians took place, and Gaza fell under the rule of Hamas, entering into a state of war with Israel. Even if its military rounds stopped for some time, the severe siege imposed on it did not stop. It is the smallest area and the most densely populated area, until the matter reached the point of a war of extermination and the submission of Gaza to the trusteeship of the Peace Council.
After President Abbas issued his decrees setting the date for the legislative elections, Hamas officially announced its approval of the decrees and its readiness to run in the elections directly and in its official name.
Hamas found in the legislative elections a suitable place to take refuge from what threatens its political existence, after the closure of the Gaza file or the first phase of it; therefore, it decided to go to the elections, but this time through an expanded list, which includes other colors not registered in the name of Hamas.
When discussing the legislative elections and Hamas's position in them, it is necessary to observe the changes that have affected its opponent, Fatah organization, in the period between the last legislative elections, and the upcoming November elections.
In the two previous elections, Fatah, despite its differences and power struggles, ran as a single central bloc. Although it did not have the qualifications to form a government, it was strongly present in influencing political life, through its control of the West Bank and its acquisition of legitimacy recognized both regionally and internationally.
The second elections produced a short-lived Hamas government, and an attempt was made to repair it by forming a coalition government. However, the experiment failed, and the division developed through a military coup carried out by Hamas against the coalition government, reaching a state of separation between the West Bank and Gaza. All attempts to end it failed, and for the first time in history, the Palestinians living under occupation had two political systems and two legitimacies: one legal, and the other a de facto legitimacy.
Hamas and Fatah are entering the elections while they are at their weakest stage. Hamas has been weakened by the war of extermination and the lack of allies, and Fatah has been weakened by its internal conflicts and the lack of a political horizon that used to justify its steps in any direction it went.
The two sides will meet in the corridor leading to the next legislative council, without any guarantees for either of them that they will be able to form a government, and this will produce different outputs for a parliament with a puzzled composition.
The expected image of the third Palestinian parliament is that it will include a limited number of formations due to the large number of lists being prepared, and their diversity in terms of tribal, regional, and sectarian affiliations.
If no surprise occurs that provides a reasonable pretext for postponing the elections, and they are held on time, the Palestinians will have a pluralistic parliament, which necessitates creation of coalitions to form a legitimate government and an effective opposition. This is what will happen for the first time since the first and second elections during the era of the Palestinian Authority, because the partisan political loyalty that imposed itself on the parliamentarians of the factions and their power will not be found this time, and perhaps we will find a parliament that changes Palestinian political life, which has lived for a long time inside the closed box of the factions with all its advantages and disadvantages.