Turkish-Israeli tensions are no longer just a reflection of the Gaza dispute or the political animosity between Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu. Developments in Syria and Lebanon reveal a deeper level of competition in shaping the balance of power in the Middle East, especially following the US-Iranian conflict and Tehran's weaker ability to play its former regional role. From here, questions come up: Will Türkiye become Israel's main regional rival? Or will the rivalry remain contained within limits that prevent direct confrontation?
This question arose after the Israeli airstrike on the Abu al-Duhur airbase in northern Syria, following a visit by a Turkish delegation. Israel justified the strike by claiming that the base was likely being used to house Turkish forces, a claim denied by Damascus. In the aftermath, Ankara accused Netanyahu of pursuing an expansionist policy that threatens regional stability. The incident demonstrated that the rivalry is nearing a military confrontation that could lead to a wider escalation if either side misjudges the other's intentions.
Syria is at the heart of this rivalry because the two sides have opposing visions for its future: Ankara wants a unified and stable Syria with a central government close to it, which is able to control its borders and prevent the establishment of an independent Kurdish entity. It also sees rebuilding the army and economy as an opportunity to expand its influence, facilitate the return of refugees, and solidify its position as the most influential power in the new Syria.
In opposition, Israel is concerned about the emergence of a strong Syrian state or a Turkish military presence near its borders. It seeks to maintain its freedom of aerial operations and prevent the development of capabilities that could restrict its actions. Therefore, it tends to prefer keeping Syria militarily weak and subject to security arrangements that limit its sovereignty, particularly in the South. Thus, the dispute transcends a specific military base and extends to the very nature of the Syrian state itself: Türkiye wants to rebuild it, while Israel wants to contain it.
The rivalry extends to Gaza Strip, where Türkiye expands its support for the Palestinians, in order to bolster its Arab and Islamic standing, while Israel views these relations as a threat.
Lebanon has also become part of this equation, with Ankara seeking to develop its political and security role and expressing its willingness to participate in security arrangements to replace UNIFIL forces in the South. Israel sees any Turkish presence within the Lebanese arena as an extension of Ankara's influence and an attempt to restrict its military freedom.
In the Eastern Mediterranean, the dispute is linked to gas, maritime borders, and Israel's alliance with Greece and Cyprus, which Türkiye views as an attempt to encircle and isolate it from energy projects. The military dimension of the dispute has been reinforced by an Israeli-Greek deal worth approximately three billion Euros to establish a versatile air and missile defense network, deepening the strategic partnership and fueling Ankara's concerns.
Iran's decline does not end the struggle for influence in the region and gradually shifted the center of gravity to Turkish-Israeli competition. However, Türkiye is not another Iran. It is a member of NATO, possesses a large economy, powerful military forces, and maintains extensive relations with the West and Arab states.
Therefore, it is difficult for Israel to use the same tools it employed against Iran and its allies against a state that is economically and militarily intertwined with the West. Washington will also not easily allow its two allies to slide into war, which explains the establishment of de-escalation channels in Syria. The upcoming Israeli elections may affect the level of escalation, as Netanyahu’s continued leadership favors a vigorous approach, while a new leadership may allow for more realistic security arrangements.
A direct war is unlikely, as economic interests, relations with the West, and the fear of erosion impose limits on escalation. The most probable outcome is a continuation of a relationship characterized by political animosity, regional rivalry, and the necessary security coordination to prevent a full-scale conflict. Therefore, the question is not whether Türkiye and Israel will go to war, but rather what kind of regional order each seeks to establish. Türkiye aims for a stable neighborhood led by central states aligned with it, while Israel seeks a weak neighborhood on its borders, guaranteeing its supremacy and freedom of action. Between these two visions, Syria remains the most crucial test, while Lebanon opens an additional arena that could make managing the competition even more difficult.