From the perspective of the actual events in Middle East, looking at Iranian behavior in the region is no longer sufficient to understand what is happening. The escalation witnessed in multiple arenas, from the Gulf to the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen, does not appear to be merely isolated reactions, but rather part of a strategic approach. In recent years, the region has become an overlapping stage for crises. The nuclear file, the missile program, regional influence, and the security of maritime routes all intersect in a single equation. Whenever negotiations or international pressures approach a decisive stage, new crises emerge in more than one arena, which rearranges the priorities of the international community and reduces the focus on the main files related to Iran.
In this regard, analysts believe that one of the most important goals of this strategy is to shift international attention from the nuclear program to managing regional crises. When navigation in the Gulf or the Red Sea, energy security, or the stability of neighboring countries become the daily headlines, the debate about uranium enrichment and the future of the nuclear program recedes to a secondary position. For a country that has been engaged in complex negotiations for years, time is not a secondary factor, but rather one of the most important elements of pressure.
This is why some experts believe that Tehran takes time as a strategic resource. Every postponed round of negotiations, and every regional crisis that captures attention, gives it an additional margin to maintain its scientific, industrial and military capabilities, and to continue developing its programs within the limits of what political and economic conditions allow. Therefore, it is certain that the time factor has remained present in most rounds of negotiations between Iran and the West.
In that context, it seems that a number of countries in the region have realized the nature of this equation. The Gulf states, which have been subjected in recent years to attacks and threats that have affected energy facilities, maritime security and their airspace, have mostly chosen a policy based on strengthening defenses, containing escalation and avoiding sliding into a broad regional confrontation. Some may interpret this behavior as cautious, but it can also be read as a strategic choice aimed at preventing any party from turning the Gulf lands into an open battlefield.
The same applies to Jordan, which dealt with the security challenges surrounding it with the logic of a state keen to protect its borders and stability, without being drawn into confrontation. Likewise, the Kurdistan Region, despite the security tensions and repeated pressures it faced, maintained an approach that preferred political and diplomatic containment, in recognition of the sensitivity of its geographical location and the complexities of the Iraqi scene.
With the escalation of tensions related to the security of the Red and Mediterranean Seas, Egypt emerged as a party concerned with protecting one of the most important maritime routes in the world. Cairo, too, reflected a keenness to protect its strategic interests and prevent the transfer of conflicts to its national soil, without engaging in confrontations that would expand the scope of the war. Thus, the common denominator between the Gulf States, Jordan, the Kurdistan Region, and Egypt was the pursuit of narrowing the extent of the conflict, not expanding it.
But the military dimension is not the only area of concern. Some believe that the most serious challenge lies in the fragility of some internal environments in the region. In countries suffering from political or sectarian divisions or weakness in state institutions, as is the case of Yemen, Iraq and Lebanon, external crises become more capable of producing internal crises, which makes building the nation-state, strengthening citizenship and the rule of law an essential part of the national security system, and not just a reform project.
Another question remains: Why have Turkey and Pakistan remained, until now, outside the circles of direct escalation? This may be due to the special nature of each of their relations with Iran, and to geopolitical balances that make the cost of opening new fronts high for all parties. However, the Middle East has repeatedly proven that maps of tension are not fixed, and that today’s calculations may differ from tomorrow’s.
The most pressing question concerns the American and European stance. Does the West aim to resolve the conflict with Iran, or merely to manage it and prevent it from escalating? Answers vary, but many observers believe that crisis management, however successful in averting a full-scale confrontation, may, in turn, grant all parties more time to regroup, thus making the conflict more complex over time.
If time is a strategic resource in the calculations of states, then preventing it from being turned into a tool for deepening crises is no less important than preventing the outbreak of wars themselves. The experience of past years has proven that the states that bet on internal cohesion, self-restraint, and prioritizing the logic of the state over the logic of emotion were the most capable of protecting their stability and foresee a better future.